Hegel's Metaphysics and Social Philosophy. Two Readings by Baumann, Charlotte




Since thinkers from Marx to Popper have criticised Hegel’s metaphys-
ics for its supposedly authoritarian implications, it is only natural that 
the late 20th century Anglo-American efforts to rehabilitate Hegel’s phi-
losophy were predicated on either downplaying or disregarding Hegel’s 
metaphysical doctrines. Robert Pippin (2008), Terry Pinkard (1994), 
Robert Brandom (2019), John McDowell (2009), Axel Honneth (2000), 
and others have respectively developed different Kant-inspired, histori-
cist and pragmatist readings of Hegel, all of which have been grouped 
as “non-metaphysical” Hegelianism. More recently, however, not only 
is there growing interest in Hegel’s metaphysics,1 but even the so-called 
non-metaphysical Hegelians have started explicitly discussing Hegel’s 
metaphysical commitments, with Pippin (2019) publishing a book-length 
study on the subject.
This latest development revives an old question: what are the social-
philosophical implications of Hegel’s metaphysics? While others have 
posed this question,2 my approach in this chapter is unique insofar as 
I contrast the former non-metaphysical reading with a traditional way 
of interpreting Hegel’s metaphysics and social philosophy, whose line-
age includes not Wittgenstein, Sellars, or Brandom, but rather Schell-
ing, Marx, and Adorno.3 I will engage with the former non-metaphysical 
view exclusively in terms of Pippin’s work. Pippin’s interpretation is 
particularly interesting, as it shares a minimal commitment with a more 
traditional metaphysical reading: Pippin has always insisted that, for 
Hegel, not everything is historical and changing. Pippin’s Hegel proposes 
a metaphysics in the sense of basic, ahistorical notions that enable any 
intelligible claims, “the distinctions and relations without which sense 
would not be possible”.4 Pippin’s Hegel is therefore more Kantian than 
the Hegel of Pinkard.5
I will oppose Pippin’s reading to my own, more traditional metaphysi-
cal interpretation, which draws on German Hegel scholarship in par-
ticular but also intersects with interpretations by Frederick Beiser (2005) 
and Stephen Houlgate (2006, 2008). I agree with Rolf-Peter Horstmann 
(1984), Christian Iber (2000), and Dieter Henrich (2007) that Hegel 
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proposes a pre-Kantian metaphysics of structures or, as Horstmann puts 
it, a “relation-ontological model”.6 Hegel’s metaphysics is pre-Kantian 
and akin to Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s rationalism, in that it does not discuss 
norms of knowledge.
Rather, Hegel looks into the nature of the mind-independent, phys-
ical world, as it is independently of being thought or judged, as well 
as the underlying structures of society and human thinking. Hegel’s 
metaphysics is a metaphysics of structures or relations, rather than a 
substance-metaphysics, because Hegel views structures/relations as more 
fundamental than substances pace Spinoza and Leibniz. (The relation of 
a substance to its accidents is one among several types of structures for 
Hegel). Everything in the world – whether biological, chemical, physical, 
or social – is defined by its internal structure as well as the structure of its 
external relations; separate, internally unstructured substances have no 
properties – besides the fact that they are unrelated, empty units, which 
is precisely their structure. For Hegel, there is only a limited number of 
basic types of structuring, all of which he discusses in his Logic. This 
means that everything has a characteristic structure, which necessarily 
displays one or several of the logical structures analysed in Hegel’s Logic.
While I agree with Horstmann et al. regarding the type of metaphysics 
Hegel pursues, I further develop their approach to show that commenta-
tors such as Henrich (1983) and Michael Theunissen (1982, 1994) are 
mistaken to allege authoritarian implications of such a metaphysics. This 
is possible, because the authoritarian worries of these thinkers are not 
linked to the traditional notion of metaphysics per se. In other words, 
they do not oppose as authoritarian the very idea that there are truths 
that do not depend on our shared convictions but are eternally valid. 
And, in contrast to Pippin, they do not reject the notion that the legiti-
macy of a society depends on that society displaying a specific and com-
plex predetermined logical structure. Rather, the worries of Henrich et al. 
arise from the specific claims Hegel is taken to make about the structures 
of the best society.7
Hegel’s metaphysics is not only important to understand his theory of 
freedom. Michael Thompson (2018b) rightly proposes that a metaphysi-
cal reading of Hegel is particularly relevant today, because (i) it offers 
normative resources that many perceive as lacking in relativist pragmatist 
or postmetaphysical approaches; and (ii) Hegel’s metaphysics helps to 
turn the focus away from equal individuals towards the social whole, 
the power it has over individuals – and, I would add, the very unequal 
positions of power individuals occupy within it. While both metaphysi-
cal readings discussed here explicate normative implications of Hegel’s 
metaphysics, in different ways, my traditional metaphysical interpreta-
tion also turns the attention to the structure of society as a whole.
For Pippin, Hegel’s Logic provides norms that determine how thinking 
beings can best make sense of the world. He presupposes that societies 
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are made up of social and epistemic practices between free individuals 
and he argues that the most fundamental norms underlying those prac-
tices are ahistorical and eternal. Those norms are rather formal, as they 
do not define what is good, but what makes a particular conception 
of the good coherent and intelligible. The formal norms of intelligibil-
ity are, however, taken to have very real consequences, since actually 
existing in the social world requires claiming a status that others under-
stand and accept. This is why Pippin notes that the Logic not only helps 
in “achieving compatible commitments”, but also concerns the correct 
“self-understanding” of “one’s involvement with institutions and with 
others” not as “domination” or “sacrifice” but as constitutive of one’s 
actual social existence.8
In my reading, Hegel’s metaphysics has a descriptive, a critical or eval-
uative, and a prescriptive function. This is so because, for Hegel, truly 
grasping an entity requires showing which of the more or less coherent 
logical structures it displays. The description of any phenomenon thus 
always comes with an evaluation of its coherence and internal problems. 
In fact, I take it that Hegel’s metaphysics does not only discuss succes-
sively more consistent types of structures or successively more successful 
ways of uniting elements into a whole. When analysing each of these 
structures, Hegel discusses the relative freedom and unfreedom of the 
whole towards its elements and vice versa, often explicitly speaking of 
“self-determination” or “being with oneself in the other”, which is his 
famous formula for freedom.9 Hegel asks, for example, whether a whole 
subsumes its elements forcefully, by imposing its laws, or whether it picks 
up on their internal structures to the effect that the whole’s freedom or 
self-determination co-exists with or even requires the self-determination 
of its parts.
Hegel’s Logic progresses from the least coherent and inclusive struc-
ture, which allows for problematic and limited types of freedom only, to 
the structure which enables most freedom and truly contains diversity. 
The Logic therefore prescribes which structure is best and which, hence, 
the best society ought to display. In his social philosophy, I  therefore 
take Hegel to propose a structural theory of freedom. Hegel’s attention 
is primarily directed at the respective whole – not because he glorifies the 
whole as an instantiation of God as critics have worried, but because the 
social whole or structure determines the options, roles, functions, and 
freedom of human beings. Any serious discussion of freedom, therefore, 
has to focus on the social structure, how it functions, and whether it is 
beneficial for and controlled by individuals. This is why Hegel highlights 
the social whole and its rationality, in the sense of a coherent, harmoni-
ous organisation of its elements. I will argue that, for Hegel, the most 
coherently organised social order necessarily coincides with the society 
that is most inclusive and self-determining and that maximises the free-
dom of each individual.
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After discussing the two varieties of metaphysics (Sections 1–3), I will 
argue that my alternative metaphysical Hegel is more realist when it 
comes to assessing the power of social structures (Section  4), focused 
on structural freedom rather than agency (Sections 5 and 6), and more 
empowering for and lenient towards individuals who can make their 
interests count and are free to be irrational and egoist (Section 7).
I
The Metaphysics of Pippin’s Hegel
Pippin takes Hegel to reject the old, pre-Kantian “substantive metaphys-
ics” of Spinoza and Leibniz, a metaphysics that wants to know “what 
there really is,” by detailing the “furniture of the universe”.10 Hegel’s new 
or post-Kantian metaphysics concerns “the authority and legitimacy of 
our claims to know”.11 For Pippin, the three books of Hegel’s Logic look 
into “meta-concepts” or notions that underlie different types of predi-
cation and interpret them as increasingly more successful attempts at 
defining something: “S is p” (Logic of Being) allows only for inadequate 
definitions of objects; “S is essentially p” (Logic of Essence) allows for 
better definitions; and “S is a good p” (Logic of the Concept) allows for 
the best and most exhaustive definitions.12 The more intelligible the defi-
nition of something is, the more “actual” it is for thought.13
As Horstmann rightly claims,14 Pippin’s Hegel uses Aristotle not to 
overcome Kant but to enrich him. The point Pippin’s Hegel takes from 
Aristotle is not that objects, independently of being thought, are like 
thought. Pippin’s Hegel rejects any metaphysics that “identifies thoughts 
with the essentialities of things”.15 Rather, Pippin’s Hegel assumes that 
the only relevant objects are objects “as thought/judged”.16 They are all 
that any sense-making being will ever have. There may well be entities 
that are non-conceptual, but if there are, they are a non-topic. Pippin 
takes Hegel to broadly agree with the Aristotelian notion that nature “is 
something that is only actual as the object or content of mind”.17 I agree 
with Horstmann18 that, for Pippin, “the object is a subjective represen-
tation of an object”, besides which there is something else, namely the 
world insofar as it is not conceptualised and made sense of by a subject.19
Therefore, when Pippin says his Hegel rejects what Pippin calls “impo-
sitionism”,20 one has to take this claim with caution. Pippin’s Hegel rejects 
the Kantian self-limitation to the human subject and its species-specific 
way of knowing;21 he, therefore, rejects the notion of structures “imposed 
by us”22 onto content received from the world. There are limitations on 
how one can make sense of anything, but those limitations are logical, 
imposed by the aim of making coherent and intelligible assertions. Nev-
ertheless, Pippin’s Hegelian metaphysics is still an impositionism of sorts, 
insofar as it looks at the rules any finite, rational being necessarily uses to 
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make sense of the world – and, hence, imposes onto the world, which is 
otherwise senseless for any finite, rational being.
It is easy to agree with Pippin that it is pointless to try to inhabit a 
perspective besides the one that any thinking being necessarily inhab-
its. Nevertheless, it is helpful to note that Pippin’s approach includes 
(i) empirical concepts, (ii) meta-concepts or norms that are “presupposed 
in any [empirical] specification”,23 and (iii) the world insofar as it is not 
“thought/judged”.24 Some may want to say that (iii) refers to a non- 
conceptual leftover, but this is too narrow. The world insofar as it is not 
thought or known also includes houses, cars, and tables, whose existence 
bears the mark of human concepts, but which are not identical to the 
representation or knowledge of them and which would continue existing 
if there were nobody to make sense of them. The world insofar as it is 
not known or thought about is irrelevant for thought, almost by defini-
tion. Nevertheless, it provides an input or matter required for empirical 
concept formation.
The fact that there is a remnant, something that does not belong to the 
theory of Pippin’s Hegel, contradicts Hegel’s claim to an absolute ideal-
ism, which encompasses everything, the entire subject and (all kinds of) 
object(s). The leftover of the world is also relevant in Pippin’s social phi-
losophy, where the natural and physical world can become relevant only 
when given the right normative form, while also providing some matter 
for thought or norm-based behaviour.
II
My Reading of Hegel’s Metaphysics
Iber summarises the traditional metaphysical way in which many, pri-
marily German Hegelians, interpret Hegel’s metaphysics: Hegel supposes 
that “reality, be it spiritual or natural reality, is essentially structured 
by relations of form [Formverhältnisse], which are in turn graspable 
according to the formalities of our thought structures”.25 Hegel enquires 
into the basic structural relations underlying mind-independent reality 
(as well as social reality and human reasoning). These structures can be 
analysed by means of human thinking, not because they stem from us, 
but because our reason is one realm within which these structures are at 
work. This is why Hegel’s ontological inquiry takes the form of a logic, 
i.e. a science of thought.
I take Hegel’s Logic to address the following question: how can plural-
ity and the whole, unity and difference co-exist in the world, and what 
patterns enable or structure their co-existence? The Logic progresses 
from the simplest pattern possible to ever more complex and coherent 
patterns. After proposing that all that exists is just one undifferenti-
ated being, Hegel is immediately forced to make space for plurality. He 
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proposes there must be “determinate being(s)” (WL1 115–38/109–28), 
a multiplicity of entities, which have being as a shared feature or are 
“something” distinct from “another” (WL1 225–131/117–122). He then 
goes on to discuss among other things: the “many” that are also just 
“one” entity spread out into many units (WL1 182–208/164–84); the 
unity that consists in “indifference” to the distinctions between things 
(WL1 445–56/375–88); things as the “appearances” that share the same 
origin or “essence” (WL2 147–63/499–511); the one “substance” and its 
“accidents” (E1 §§150–2; WL2 186–99/530–40); the difference in unity 
that he calls “the concept” (WL2 273–300/600–21); the mechanical laws 
uniting objects (WL2 409–27/711–26); the organism as an internally dif-
ferentiated system (E1 §216; WL2 476/766); and so on.
All these structures are not thought determinations or ways sense- 
making beings coherently think of elements as belonging together. Rather 
they are patterns that exist in physical nature (independently of whether 
anybody makes sense of nature or not), as well as in human thought and 
interaction. Hegel assumes that everything in the world, be it natural, 
physical, or social, has a structure and displays one or several of the basic 
types of structuring discussed in the Logic. He presupposes a hierarchy 
of natural and spiritual entities from less to more complex, just as he sup-
poses a hierarchy from simple to ever more complex logical structures. 
Simple things and elements of complex entities display simple structures 
from the beginning of the Logic, while complex logical structures sys-
tematically characterise more complex things and the interconnection of 
all things. This means that while the constellations at the beginning of 
the Logic can be exemplified by a stone, as well as by legal personhood, 
the later structures are only present in complex natural phenomena, 
organisms, and, finally, human thought, action, and interaction.
To understand this type of metaphysics, it is helpful to think of laws 
and regularities in nature like the elliptical movement of planets.26 Ellip-
ses are not empirical concepts; Kepler did not discover the elliptical form 
by observing nature. The ellipsis is a structure or shape that is arrived 
at by pure reason and yet it is also present in mind-independent real-
ity. In other words, Hegel does not propose that planetary movements 
are described as elliptical in astrophysics. Rather, he says that planetary 
movements are elliptical, whether anybody knows or conceptualises it. 
And Hegel believes that this is a commonly held assumption. He laments 
our taking for granted that we cognise nature by means of reason, pre-
supposing that physical, external nature is itself rational, while we do not 
accept that the same holds for social reality (EPR: 15/12). Hegel offers 
a “philosophical exposition that uses a so-called a priori method in an 
otherwise empirical science” (VG 87f/64). But like Kepler, this does not 
mean he is “importing ideas into matter” (VG 87f/64). The logical prin-
ciples and structures that can be known a priori are present or active in 
the mind-independent world, as well as in society and human thought.
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III
“Pre-Positing”: Absolute Idealism and the Two  
Different Hegels
A key difference between my reading and Pippin’s can be explained via 
Hegel’s notion of pre-positing/presupposing and reflection. For Pippin, 
the Logic discusses “positing” and “reflection” on such positing, the pre-
suppositions of judgements, and the “consciousness” of those presuppo-
sitions.27 This point goes back to the core of Hegel’s disagreement with 
Kant. Hegel delivered a scathing critique of Kant’s position, which is 
derisively characterised as “pre-positing” and “external reflection” (WL2 
31/404f.) with Kant developing a “philosophy of reflection” (GW). “Pre-
positing” or “presupposing” means positing something as un-posited, 
cheating oneself into believing that what one presupposes is indepen-
dently true. Among other things, Hegel is referring to Kant’s thing-in-
itself. The thing-in-itself, the unknowable external reality is nothing but 
a posit by Kant.
The question is “What does Hegel conclude from this insight? Does 
he embrace this idea, as Pippin suggests,28 and argue that all objects are 
posited by thinking? Or is Hegel making the critical point that taking 
the object as an independent substance inaccessible to thought is but a 
creation of thought, a (possibly false) assumption?” Kant shows that an 
inaccessible object is necessarily implied in a judgement-based theory 
of knowledge, but judgements only provide a flawed and limited kind 
of knowledge, for Hegel. In fact, while metaphysicians like Spinoza or 
Leibniz are superior to Kant, insofar as they assume that “the determina-
tions of thought are the basic determinations of objects” (E1 §28), one of 
their mistakes is to develop their theories by way of judgements.29 When 
one overcomes this problematic type of knowledge, one can revitalise 
metaphysics and overcome Kant’s unwarranted “fear of the object” (WL 
45/51). That is to say, when one stops attributing predicates to subject 
terms, guided by the principles and requirements of subjective thought, 
and begins observing an object’s own internal structure and the unfolding 
of its elements, then one can start to see that the object is itself rational 
and conceptually structured. This is the position of my metaphysical 
Hegel: mind-independent reality, the physical and external world is 
knowable, and akin to thought.
Interpreting Hegel in this way allows one to make better sense of both 
Hegel’s absolute idealism and his opposition to the “subjective idealism” 
of Kant and Fichte. It is a significant weakness in Pippin’s approach that 
he not only interprets Hegel’s Logic as a theory of judgement, but also 
proposes a strong link between Hegel and these two thinkers. For Hegel, 
Fichte’s and Kant’s “subjective idealism states: There are no external 
things; they are but a determination of our self” (VGP 207) and “real 
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existence  .  .  . external being is sublated in the simplicity of the I, it is 
only for me, it is ideally within me” (WL1 137/155).30 Hegel’s absolute 
idealism, by contrast, agrees with “ordinary realistic consciousness” (E1 
§45A) – i.e. Hegel accepts that there are many objects that would con-
tinue to exist (and have the same logical structure) after the demise of 
sense-making beings. Nevertheless, Hegel’s philosophy is a form of ide-
alism, as he proposes that what seems to exist independently must be 
considered an “ideal moment” of a broader system (E1 §160A), whose 
basic structure he calls “the Idea”.31 Schelling (1994: 138, 143, 151), 
Hegel’s erstwhile friend and collaborator, notes in many places that 
Hegel wanted to encompass the material world in his philosophy: “exist-
ence”, “nature”, and not merely their concepts. And he remarks that 
Hegel follows a pre-Kantian, Leibnizian rationalist metaphysics in doing 
so, presupposing that mind-independent reality can be known through 
pure reason.32
Does this difference matter for Hegel’s Realphilosophie? Yes. A struc-
tural metaphysical reading can do justice to the richness of Hegel’s 
thought, as it relies on Hegel’s method of sublation (Aufhebung). The 
German term “aufheben” means “to keep”, and Hegel claims that he 
keeps elements of all criticised positions and relations. In my reading, this 
means that simpler logical relations are elements of the more coherent 
structures discussed later in the Logic. It also means that all parts of the 
Logic have some relevance for each part of his Realphilosophie. This is 
to say: you can show how the simple types of structures presented in the 
Logic of Being are at work in parts of today’s social world – in simpler 
relations like abstract right.33
For Pippin, by contrast, only the end of the Logic, namely the concept 
as he interprets it, captures modern society. Furthermore, the “domain 
of relevance” of the Logic is, on Pippin’s reading, primarily the realm of 
philosophy: “those objects about which we say nonempirically what they 
are: Geist, the state, friendship, art, religion”.34 Hegel’s metaphysics pro-
vides guidelines to define something coherently and argues that the more 
intelligible something is, the more actual it is for sense-making beings. 
This is most relevant for notions that can be defined “nonempirically”, 
meaning: (almost) exclusively conceptually, with little reference to sen-
sory detail. The notions Pippin mentions like art or friendship function 
as norms, which actual empirical phenomena need to embody in order to 
count as true art or a true friendship.
In my reading, on the contrary, Hegel’s metaphysics applies to the 
entire natural and social world. Hegel detects basic structuring principles 
that are part of the thing’s own structure, the physical blood circulation 
(not the description of it), the interaction between organs, the structure 
of a plant, and so on. Before discussing Hegel’s social philosophy in more 
detail, it is important to specify what exactly Hegel refers to when he 
speaks of society, on the two readings.
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IV
Hegel’s Social World and Social Individuals
For Pippin, Hegel’s metaphysics is not concerned with the “furniture 
of the universe”.35 Similarly, Hegel’s social philosophy is not concerned 
with what there is in society, cars, buildings, human bodies, quasi- 
natural regularities. Pippin’s Hegel is interested in “the normative, the type 
of actions that are characterised by the effort of ‘doing it correctly’ ”.36
Pippin’s Hegel basically transforms Habermas’s notion of a social space 
governed only by the structures of rational argumentation, by saying that 
(i) what counts as rational argumentation is largely historical and inter-
subjectively developed rather than a priori, and (ii) the entire modern 
social world is a social space thus reconceived. For Pippin, the modern 
social order derives its authority not from an appeal to brute force or a 
God-given right, but from an appeal to reasons, as does the authority 
of the different positions and roles within this society. This is why mod-
ern society is more “actual” than earlier societies, a better expression of 
“what a real social order is”,37 namely one that is appropriate to thinking 
beings. The acts and roles of human beings function like claims that oth-
ers freely reject or accept based on collectively shared norms.
For Pippin, “freedom is normatively constrained judgement and rational 
action”.38 The norms or reasons that make me an actual subject can only 
be obtained from and validated within practices or social roles by receiv-
ing, interpreting, and presenting as reasons the considerations that peo-
ple usually have as parents, consumers, property owners, and so on.39 
Being an actual subject is not a natural fact but requires acting in a way 
that makes me an intelligible instance of subjectivity. While the norms or 
definitions of what it is to be a subject or a property owner are themselves 
historical, their intelligibility depends on ahistorical meta-concepts out-
lined in the Logic. The historical norms are constantly revised, discussed, 
and improved and lose their validity if most individuals come to find 
them indefensible. Additionally, and importantly, norms are only bind-
ing for any individual if there is a “genuinely subjective” endorsement 
on the part of that individual, rather than a mere “re-enactment of an 
inherited convention”.40
My traditional metaphysical Hegel, by contrast, makes the realist 
point that society does not primarily consist in practices and norms that 
bind persons only if they agree with them and that cease to exist once we 
all disagree with them. Everything is structured, but only some aspects of 
some structures are norm-based practices. In fact, there is an enormous 
infrastructural, legal, logistical underbelly to our social world that would 
not change immediately even if we changed our collective mind.
Let us take the market as an example: while exchange of equivalents, 
equal rights for all persons, and the “fulfilment of a contract”41 can be 
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considered some of the norms of the market, those norms are different 
from the structure of the market in the sense of economic laws like the 
price mechanism. One could say that human beings may refrain from 
participating in market relations; in this sense, there is an element of 
consent. However, one does not really have the option of not participat-
ing – unless one goes to absolute extremes. Similarly, a particular person 
may decide not to abide by the norms governing fatherhood. But from 
parental leave to the lack of baby changing units in men’s restrooms, 
there are many legal, institutional, and even infrastructural limits that 
make dissenting very difficult. And even if we all managed to erase rac-
ism from every corner of our minds, there would still be books, songs, 
and statues, as well as unequal income distribution, housing segregation, 
missed job opportunities, maternal deaths, incarcerations, life chances, 
and much more that would still bear the mark of racism.
In my reading, Hegel starts with the basic assumptions that (i) all inter-
personal (and other) relations distribute positions of power, functions, 
and roles – and exist within a large structured web of relations (i.e. pace 
Pippin, structures are not those of rational coherence that free and equal 
agents require of each other); (ii) those structures have an independence 
from human beings that goes beyond mere habit (i.e. pace Pippin, struc-
tures are not just binding if and to the extent that we consider them 
valid); (iii) in contrast to what Pippin’s Hegel suggests, structures are not 
necessarily something good or conducive to human freedom.
It is worth expanding on point (iii). Pippin’s Hegel blurs the distinction 
between “the normative”, in the sense of practices that involve notions 
of how one does something right, and the normative question of whether 
those practices are good. Partly, this has to do with the fact that Pip-
pin only looks at modern society, within which, he assumes, authority 
is justified by convincing reasons.42 And, partly, it has to do with the 
notion that social practices enable us to be subjects in the first place. But 
there are stable social practices and roles – e.g. the Mafia code or cisgen-
der, “real” masculinity – which provide a sense of self and reasons that 
are adequate given the contexts. And yet, these stable social practices 
and norms, however, are not necessarily positive ones. To make matters 
worse, the possibility of individual criticism or “genuinely subjective”43 
endorsement is limited. Since human beings are subjects only by partici-
pating in practices, they can criticise practices only based on other prac-
tices in which they partake. Freedom and my evaluation of society thus 
have much to do with a coherence of commitments. But this coherence 
can be interpreted very differently: the equality of persons may seem to 
contradict a strong male-female distinction, while the importance of spe-
cific roles speaks in favour of it. And even if modern social norms were 
coherent, it is debatable whether they work to the benefit of most people.
Pippin adds other elements to his account to avoid this problem. For 
example, Pippin suggests that, for Hegel, the “realisation of the object’s 
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potential”, like one’s masculinity, only carries a normative weight if this 
“object itself is a rationally required component of the objective human 
world, required for that world to be truly a human one”.44 Again, this is 
a vague criterion for an important distinction. Discourses on masculinity, 
for example, go both ways, with some arguing that a strong male-female 
distinction and/or proactive men are important for our value system, the 
family, or even the survival of mankind, and others denying it.
In my reading, by contrast, the normative question of whether a struc-
ture is good is separate from the question of whether there are structures 
at play (which there always are). This is so for two reasons. First, human 
beings are in a much stronger position to evaluate and make demands on 
society. This is so not only because Hegel’s Logic provides them with the 
notion of what the best social order ought to be like. More importantly, 
human beings have complex identities that do not coincide with prac-
tices or roles – and which enable them to notice and complain when a 
structure works to their disadvantage. Human beings cannot only reason 
or, indeed, have valid needs within the realm provided by them. This is 
so because of the natural composition of human beings, their reflective 
capacity, and simply because norm-based practices are not all there is in 
society, and hence human beings are subjected and react to much more 
pressures and realities than reasons and norms.
Second, the Logic shows that not all structures benefit the elements 
involved. In fact, more specifically, Hegel proposes that the market econ-
omy is a “monstrous system” that needs to be “tamed like a wild beast” 
(JS 230/249), as he puts it in the early Jena years. Lisa Herzog has con-
vincingly shown that this remains Hegel’s position in his Philosophy of 
Right,45 where, while drawing on Smith’s account of the price mechanism 
or “invisible hand”, he remains critical of said mechanism. I  want to 
propose that Hegel understands the market laws with the help of his 
logical notion of “objective laws,” which he describes as the “cunning of 
reason” (E1 §209A). Objective laws pick up on the internal characteris-
tics of objects (their weight and volume or, in a social context, the pref-
erences and decisions of individuals). Nevertheless, because the object 
contains its characteristics as a mere “aggregate” (WL2 411/712), i.e. 
in an unstructured manner, it cannot establish relations to other objects 
based on its character. Therefore, the relations between objects take the 
form of a law-like, external imposition or “violence” (WL2 420–1/721) 
towards the objects. Similarly, market laws function like an “external” 
or “blind necessity” (E3 §532) imposing prices, deciding who can buy 
and sell, and where investments are made, and they do so by accumulat-
ing the unstructured decisions of atomistic market participants.
This means that modern individuals experience the market as not 
reflecting their needs, interests, or intentions  – which enables them to 
reflect on, formulate, and specify their interests. And it also leads Hegel to 
conclude, as will be seen at the end of the next section, that the function 
154 Charlotte Baumann
of the political institutions is for individuals to collectively control and 
re-appropriate the market.
V
Overcoming Moralität and the Standpoint of Agency
In my reading, Pippin’s Hegel fails to truly overcome the standpoint of 
Moralität, or, indeed, the standpoint of agency. Hegel derives the term 
“Moralität” or “morality” from the French “le moral” as opposed to “le 
physique” (E3 §503). Morality encompasses everything internal that a 
subject wants to externalise (E3 §503), which includes purposes, inten-
tions, and one’s notion of the good. In the Morality chapter in the Phi-
losophy of Right, Hegel shows that freedom based on individual agency 
is important, but flawed and insufficient. While Pippin is adamant that 
Hegel does not pursue a theory of “causal agency”,46 of atomistic agents 
independently causing their actions, his Hegel, in contrast to mine, nev-
ertheless remains concerned with agency – with its social conditions or 
constitution.
I will sketch Hegel’s argument in the Morality chapter to show where 
the two interpretations diverge. Hegel distinguishes three types of acting: 
acting on purpose, with intention, and based on one’s conscience. “The 
aim [of the Morality chapter] is that this subjective will becomes identi-
cal to the concept of the will; in itself it is identical with it” (PRV21: 
§114). The structure of the Morality chapter is based on the assump-
tion that the subjective will, the will of any one particular actor, ought 
to become identical to the concept of free willing. The concept of free 
willing is self-relation, an identity with oneself (EPR: §108A); Hegel 
interprets the (Kantian) demand of a non-contradiction of the will as an 
identity between the will’s internal aim and its external expression, or the 
“maxim” and the “act” (PRV19: §105).47 With each new form of acting 
Hegel discusses, the aspect of self-relation in the individual’s interaction 
with the world can thus be expected to increase ideally to a point where 
change brought about by the act is nothing but an expression of the indi-
vidual will and, hence, the individual act of willing completely instanti-
ates the form of free willing.48
Interestingly, Hegel presents the three types of acts both in terms 
of the self-relation or the “return into oneself” (EPR: §141N), and in 
terms of a “breach” (EPR: §118) between those aspects of the act that 
are wanted and those that are not, wherein the subject fails to be free. 
Hegel summarises the progression of the Morality chapter as follows: 
“Subjectivity – return into itself – α) knowledge of what is  immediate – 
ß) the universal of the deed – γ) the universal nature in terms of the 
concept  – the good” (EPR: §141N). When acting on purpose, one 
wants the “immediate” movement of one’s muscles and their immediate 
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effect; one wants and achieves an “alteration to this given existence 
[Dasein]” (EPR: §115). The problem is that there is a “breach within 
the action . . . between what is given and simply there and what is pro-
duced [by me]” (EPR: §118). What is “given” conditions my act and is 
not part of my freedom. My deed is at the mercy of “external forces” 
and has “remote and alien consequences” (EPR: §118) and, indeed, a 
social meaning I did not take into account. Acting with intention, by 
contrast, means wanting the “universal of the deed” (EPR: §141N), its 
social meaning and usual consequences, which therefore form part of 
my freedom.
When introducing intention, Hegel thus makes a point that Pippin,49 
Michael Quante,50 and others have highlighted: the “act-description” of 
my act is not within my control; or, in Hegel’s words, acts have a “uni-
versal predicate” (EPR: §119) and exist within “circumstances” (EPR: 
§119A) that I  must acknowledge. If I  want my act to be understood 
correctly and not done away with, my action has to “conform to what is 
recognised as valid in the world” (EPR: §132).
If this were Hegel’s last word on the matter, Katerina Deligiorgi rightly 
points out, agency would be reduced to “social etiquette” whereupon 
acts are evaluated against “what is socially current at any one time”.51 
However, Hegel says that when realising an intention, there is a “breach” 
between “what is given externally as a universal will and the particular 
determination I attribute to it” (EPR: §118). The universal meaning of 
an act is given to me by social custom. What I intend with this deed, in 
terms of my well-being or simply what I want my deed to mean, is not 
necessarily identical to the social meaning.
The subject thus encounters a dilemma that Pippin’s and my Hegel 
tackle very differently. There seem to be two impossible alternatives: On 
the one hand, there is (i) the possibility of choosing between and enact-
ing given social options. Hegel famously rejects choice as a strong form 
of freedom. He does so not because the options offered by society may 
be bad or one may not know how to decide between them. Rather, the 
problem is that the “will has some content, but not subjectivity itself as 
its content” (EPR: §120N):
The good and the right are also a content – not just a natural content, 
but a content that is posited by my rationality itself; and to make 
my freedom the content of my will is a pure determination of my 
freedom itself.
(EPR: §121A)
Freedom in a strong sense cannot consist in the formality that I  have 
chosen this option, that I agree with the norm governing my behaviour. 
The highest degree of freedom requires that the content of my will, what 
I want, stems from me.
156 Charlotte Baumann
This notion of freedom (ii), at least when read along Kantian lines, 
also seems impossible. Enacting purely the “concept of the will”, the 
pure form of free willing would, indeed, mean total freedom because it is 
me determining myself without any external input. However, Kant’s pure 
principle of freedom is famously “non-productive” (EPR: §135A) for 
Hegel: one cannot derive any content, any specific aims, social structures 
or rules from Kant’s formal principle of freedom. Hence, Kant’s formal 
principle of freedom cannot inform any actions.
This is where Pippin and I diverge: For Pippin, Hegel chooses option 
(i). Pippin’s Hegel opposes any prescription by “pure practical reason”52 – 
or, indeed, by pure theoretical reason. For Pippin, individuals have to 
“genuinely subjectively” appropriate or interpret the socially given.53 In 
my reading, by contrast, Hegel argues for option (ii). Subjectivity, the 
free will, and reason have a specific, unchanging, and pure structure, and 
he proposes that wanting this structure (to exist in the world) is the true 
form of freedom. Kant was right to demand a pure, a priori principle of 
freedom, but he defined it incorrectly. If defined correctly, this a priori 
principle is productive and enables us to see what the best society is like.
From where does this new principle of freedom and its implied, com-
plex structure suddenly emerge? Hegel only obliquely references the 
Actuality chapter in his Logic of Essence.54 Throughout his Logic, Hegel 
discusses ever more complex ways of uniting plurality and the whole. 
I take it that these structures are nothing but basic types of freedom or 
“being with oneself in the other”, ways in which a whole is self-related 
in its parts and those parts are “with themselves”, affirmed or not by the 
whole and other elements. Hegel’s Logic thus not only improves Kant’s 
notion of what freedom is, namely not pure self-relation, but a self- 
relation that involves otherness. More importantly, the development of 
the Logic shows that this revised principle of freedom is “productive”; 
it generates a very complex and specific structure from a first notion 
that unity and difference co-exist. Hegel references the Actuality chapter 
because after discussing atomistic persons and separate subjects sharing 
the same moral essence, he starts analysing the social whole – and how it is 
“actualised” in its elements, expressed and visible in their interrelation.55
VI
The State-Subject and State-Organism
In my reading, Hegel thus proposes that the structures of free relations 
discussed in the Logic pre-define which structures the best type of state 
needs to display. Pippin’s Hegel suggests something ostensibly similar. 
The political state can be considered good because it is the “embodi-
ment of rational self-legislation”.56 The problem is, of course, that any 
state is self-legislating if sovereign, which means that one needs a much 
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more detailed argument to show why Hegel’s version of the modern state 
best embodies self-legislation. Pippin can refrain from specifying further, 
because the notion that the state embodies self-legislation is unimportant 
for his account. The argument is neither that individuals ought to want 
the pure principle of self-legislation and measure the state against it, nor 
that one can deduce a concrete state structure from such a principle. 
Rather, the argument is that human beings need social practices to have 
reasons for acting and, then  – almost as an afterthought  – that mod-
ern practices are good, because they are similar to a subject. And Pippin 
attributes only a “light,” “non-regulative” notion of political institutions 
to Hegel.57
This contrasts with a more traditional metaphysical reading. From this 
viewpoint, the question is “What are the key logical structures discussed 
form the Actuality chapter onward and what do they mean for Hegel’s 
account of the state in his Philosophy of Right?” Henrich,58 Haber-
mas,59 and others have worried about Hegel’s logical notions of absolute 
subjectivity and the organism, and their link to state-subject and state- 
organism. Does the state-subject reduce human beings to its tools? Does 
the state-organism attribute predetermined functions to them? In my 
reading, Hegel’s Logic paints a different picture. Hegel’s reasoning con-
cerns the whole, which in social terms he calls “the state”, meaning soci-
ety as a whole, as opposed to the political institutions, which he calls 
“the political state” (EPR: §§267, 273). Hegel argues that the whole or 
absolute cannot be something that exists alongside finite things (human 
beings). If it were, it would not be all-encompassing and would conse-
quently be instable and incoherent. The whole must rather be present in 
finite things and their relations. The whole can only be present in finite 
things and their relations if it is nothing but an expression of their natures 
or characters (their respective interests and collective decisions).
Paul Giladi is therefore right to defend Hegel against Adorno’s worries 
that Hegel disregards individuality in the search for unity.60 Individuality 
requires negation or differentiation for Hegel, to be sure; however, that 
does not mean that individuals are nothing but knots in a web of rela-
tions or nothing but their differences from others. Hegel overcomes this 
viewpoint already within the Logic of Being and argues for an internal 
self-differentiation as well. What that implies first comes to the fore in 
Hegel’s concept of “formed matter” (WL2 93f/454), whereby he pro-
poses that matter has its own form. The total relations of form must 
express matter’s form rather than impose a form onto unformed mat-
ter.61 The separation between the absolute and finite things can only be 
overcome, as Hegel puts it, if the whole and finite things are “one and 
the same content,” and only display “a difference in form” (E1 §153A). 
The most emphatic formulation of this reasoning can be found in the 
transition to the logical notion of the organism, which recovers and 
specifies a structure Hegel calls the Concept: “[E]xternal determinateness 
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[of finite things] has now further developed into self-determining” (WL2 
444/740). “The object must spontaneously (out of its own impetus) unite 
into the unity of the Concept” (WL2 451/746). A whole with the form 
of the Concept is nothing but the relations things establish “out of their 
own impetus”.
Pace Henrich, Hegel explicitly says that the (state-)organism does not 
refer to pre-established functions, “determinations that are external to/
for (them)” (WL2 457/750), into which human beings must fit. Pace 
Pippin, it does not mean that human beings only become individuals, 
and fully human, by inhabiting roles. Rather, human beings have identi-
ties and (particular economic) interests, and the state-organism, namely 
the estates assembly with representatives for each professional group, is 
where they coordinate those interests to ensure that their relations benefit 
all groups.62
The organism is an aesthetic Romantic ideal.63 It denotes both the 
beauty of a proportionate, balanced order (where no organ or social 
group dominates the others) and a natural, free self-organisation of the 
participating groups. Hegel contrasts an organicist state with a mecha-
nistic or “machine” state (VD 481/22), where rulers treat social groups 
like lifeless parts of a machine. Hegel speaks of a “spiritless” administra-
tive state where a “formless mass” of atomistic individuals is “regulated 
from above” (VD 484/25). The rulers feel an “illiberal jealousy of the 
independent command and organisation of an estate, corporation etc.” 
(VD 481/22) and do not allow for “the participation of one’s own will in 
universal affairs” (VD 482/23). In an organicist state, by contrast, estates 
assembly is the powerful legislative and market-regulating organ where 
different groups represent and coordinate their interest to their mutual 
benefit. They do so not only by making laws, but also by approving the 
budget (see E3 §544), regulating prices, and even, if necessary, “deter-
mining everyone’s labour” (EPR: §236).64
Hegel’s notion of absolute, self-knowing state-subjectivity adds two 
propositions: in the best social order, subject and object need to be identi-
cal (human beings and social groups are both the subject and the object 
of law-making) and human beings must know what they aim for in law-
making. In the best social order, the members of the estates assembly con-
sciously try to preserve an organic, well-balanced, and mutually beneficial 
organisation of interests as well as spaces where individuals can freely 
live other, less immediately interdependent aspects of their personalities.
VII
Empowering Real Individuals vs. Subjectivity as a Status
Despite its focus on the social whole and predetermined rational struc-
tures, the Hegel of my metaphysical reading empowers individuals – much 
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more so than Pippin’s. Critics of a metaphysical reading of my sort have 
often admonished that individuals do not collectively decide what the 
best and most rational social order is like. This is true. However, Hegel 
is clear that human beings are free not to do what is most rational.65 And 
it must be said that even on Pippin’s reading, present-day individuals do 
not freely decide what the best society is either. They merely pick up on 
and, within the given social limits, evaluate what previous generations 
have assumed to be so.
But, in my reading, Hegel is more lenient, accepting, and empowering 
towards individuals in their entire personas, including their irrational, 
egoist, and natural aspects and particular interests. As noted, freedom 
is norm-based, “rational action” for Pippin.66 The more reasons I  can 
give for my action, the “freer” this action is, the more it is “genuinely 
mine”.67 This makes me a better or more complete actualisation of the 
essence of a human and thinking being. Since Pippin assumes that only 
social practices and roles provide us with reasons, this practically means 
the following: the more I can inhabit a role, take the reasons or consid-
erations offered for a role to be mine, shape my drives, needs, and desires 
in a manner that is adequate to my role, the freer and the more fully 
human I am.68
In my reading, by contrast, Hegel assumes that, legally, one cannot be 
more or less of a person and any act is, as a matter of fact, attributed to 
the individual who acted (even though the sentence will be more lenient if 
one was overtaken by emotions). Hegel does not add normative pressure 
to this legal fact; he does not add the notion that one is a better, fuller, 
freer actualisation of a human being, the better one can explain one’s acts. 
In fact, I believe Hegel is open to the idea that freedom also requires not 
having to be a coherent subject all of the time. Pace McDowell (2007), 
irrational impulses do not need to be rationalised because they need not 
be attributable to me. Hegel allows for individuals to be irrational and 
egoistic, to act on natural impulses, and to refrain from giving reasons to 
themselves and others.69 The term “rationality” has its most important 
application not in human beings, but in the social structure, which ought 
to be rational, in the sense of a coherent, inclusive, harmonious order.
Furthermore, for Pippin, individuals have to come to the “habitualised 
understanding” that what appear to be “sacrifices of individuality or the 
domination of individuals by larger social wholes” are actually part of 
their freedom.70 They need to “accept the purpose of the world as their 
own” and want to participate in “the good” or “what the state of the 
world requires”.71
In my reading, by contrast, there is no universal good, no “purpose 
of the world” or state besides the rational structuring and coordination 
of particular interests and the coherent inclusion of all aspects of human 
beings. Otherwise, the common good would be an empty notion.72 Hegel 
could not anticipate the complexities of today’s identities and probably 
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underestimated those that existed in his time. Nevertheless, his reason-
ing implies that, when Sara Ahmed writes about a world that does not 
“accommodate”73 her as a homosexual woman of colour, it is not up to 
her to try to feel accommodated and come to believe that her true identity 
consists in the roles she inhabits. Rather, it is up to the social world to 
ensure that the groups she belongs to have the power to shape the world 
in such a way that it corresponds to their needs and interests as much as 
to those of others.
I thus agree with Honneth74 that capturing the normative element of 
Hegel’s argument involves focusing on his ideal of a complete inclusion 
of all individuals with all their aspects. The difference lies in what we 
take this to mean. This is not the place to discuss potential internal weak-
nesses of Honneth’s position, such as an overly partitioned stereotypical 
view of human beings and their needs (for types of recognition), or his 
focus on recognition in the sense of the subject feeling supported and 
accepted (rather than human beings shaping their world). The fundamen-
tal difference between Honneth’s more pragmatist and my more meta-
physical approach relates back to the relation between the universal and 
the particular. Giladi is right to point out that Adorno criticised Hegel 
for prioritising the universal over the particular or prioritising unity over 
plurality. However, at least in my reading, the solution is not to say that 
what really matters for Hegel is intersubjectivity, human beings, and 
their structured relations.
Rather, the whole or unity is, indeed, of paramount interest for Hegel. 
This is his controversial but compelling core metaphysical proposition. 
However, the question remains: What does the best social whole look 
like for Hegel? I argue that it is an organic collective subjectivity. Unlike 
Honneth’s, Pippin’s, and, indeed, Giladi’s reading, my Hegel is thus not 
concerned with the intersubjective conditions or “relational institu-
tions”75 required for individuals to achieve self-realisation and a healthy 
subjectivity. In my reading, Hegel is not concerned with “the reciprocal 
satisfaction of their individual aims”,76 others promoting my “preferred 
form of self-realisation”.77 He is not concerned with my choice, my pro-
ject, my perception of said project and of the participation of others in it. 
This is too subjectivist.
In my reading, Hegel begins with the social whole, admits its predom-
inance, and then proposes that he knows how it ought to be shaped, 
namely as an organism and collective subjectivity along the lines described 
in his Logic. By proposing this metaphysical structure to be realised in 
social reality, Hegel empowers individuals through the backdoor, as it 
were, by pointing out that the best structure is the one in which indi-
vidual (economic) groups coordinate their interests (which they have not 
as a matter of choice or self-perception, but as a by-product of occupying 
a position within a structured system). Hegel is, certainly, speaking of 
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“institutionalising cooperation”78 in the labour, and, indeed, commod-
ity market. Giladi (2020) and Bernardo Ferro79 are right: Hegel not only 
rejects a purely representative democracy,80 but his critique of capitalism 
also raises the question whether what Hegel envisions is still a capitalist 
economy. But Hegel insists on the importance of coordination, not in 
order for individuals to realise their projects. Coordination is required 
because Hegel speaks of identities, and he understands those identities 
(e.g. being a woman or person of colour) as roles or positions of power 
within a structure wherein another group benefits from them and will 
have to pay a certain cost when the other group asserts its interests.
In this chapter, I have outlined key differences between a more tradi-
tional metaphysical Hegel, closer to Marx, and a more pragmatic and 
(politically) liberal Hegel proposed by Pippin. While the social philoso-
phy and metaphysics of my more traditional Hegel certainly do not pro-
vide a blueprint for a better society, they offer much needed input and a 
different perspective on the social whole, its power, and the best way to 
be free within it. Hegel proposes that all relations are structured and that 
we cannot be free unless we re-appropriate them; unless we collectively 
negotiate our different interests, find a mutually beneficial and balanced 
compromise, and then shape social structures accordingly by means of 
laws and market regulations. I can only agree with Adorno who insisted 
that one ought to ask “what the present means in the face of Hegel”,81 
rather than whether “Hegel has any meaning for the present”. In other 
words, rather than claiming this and that Hegelian notion is outdated 
and idealist, it is more fruitful to acknowledge and discuss what Hegel 
believed necessary and possible, and measure reality against it.82
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